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Abstract
Background:  In most studies on human reward processing, reward intensity has been
manipulated on an objective scale (e.g., varying monetary value). Everyday experience, however,
teaches us that objectively equivalent rewards may differ substantially in their subjective incentive
values. One factor influencing incentive value in humans is branding. The current study explores the
hypothesis that individual brand preferences modulate activity in reward areas similarly to
objectively measurable differences in reward intensity.
Methods: A wheel-of-fortune game comprising an anticipation phase and a subsequent outcome
evaluation phase was implemented. Inside a 3 Tesla MRI scanner, 19 participants played for
chocolate bars of three different brands that differed in subjective attractiveness.
Results: Parametrical analysis of the obtained fMRI data demonstrated that the level of activity in
anatomically distinct neural networks was linearly associated with the subjective preference
hierarchy of the brands played for. During the anticipation phases, preference-dependent neural
activity has been registered in premotor areas, insular cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and in the
midbrain. During the outcome phases, neural activity in the caudate nucleus, precuneus, lingual
gyrus, cerebellum, and in the pallidum was influenced by individual preference.
Conclusion: Our results suggest a graded effect of differently preferred brands onto the incentive
value of objectively equivalent rewards. Regarding the anticipation phase, the results reflect an
intensified state of wanting that facilitates action preparation when the participants play for their
favorite brand. This mechanism may underlie approach behavior in real-life choice situations.
Background
What counts as reward differs substantially depending on
individual preferences. Branding can elicit robust differ-
ences in preferences for consumer products despite their
highly similar appearance and may therefore provide an
ideal example of truly subjective preference in that it is
largely independent of objective stimulus characteristics.
Indeed, branding can be viewed as the assignment of
value and meaning to often quite mundane and inter-
changeable products [e.g., [1]]. Current theories of reward
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processing have paid increasing attention to such cultural
influences on choice behavior. Our aim is to expand these
theories by examining the modulatory impact of subjec-
tive brand preferences on neural activity. Furthermore, the
external validity of our findings is enhanced by the high
relevance of brands in everyday life.
Most previous research on the neural representation of
reward has focused on the manipulation of reward
according to an objectively quantifiable scale without
therefore having to consider individual differences in pref-
erences. There is no doubt that people have a general pref-
erence for larger rather than smaller amounts of money.
Many human imaging studies have made explicit use of
various degrees of monetary incentive value as means to
manipulate reward intensity, and have reported several
neural regions that adapt their activity according to the
changes in reward intensity. O'Doherty et al., for example,
reported stronger recruitment of the medial orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC) upon gaining higher compared with smaller
amounts of money in a two-alternative choice task [2]. In
another study, Breiter et al. identified the sublenticular
extended amygdala (SLEA), the Nucleus accumbens
(NAcc) and the hypothalamus as showing a scaled neural
response in correspondence with the value of received
monetary gain [3]. In addition, neural activation patterns
in the SLEA and in the OFC reflected the value of the
potential rewards in the period in which participants
anticipated the outcome. A later study by Knutson et al.
found a dissociation of neural circuits involved in differ-
ent aspects of reward: While the ventral striatum (incl.
NAcc) was strongly active during the anticipation of mon-
etary reward, the mesial prefrontal cortex (PFC), the pari-
etal cortex and the posterior cingulum were active
following feedback to the participants of having success-
fully obtained a reward [4]. During reward anticipation,
the NAcc activity was positively correlated with the mag-
nitude of the monetary reward.
However, even the rewarding value of money may be influ-
enced by context effects. Counterfactual reasoning, for
example, refers to people's tendency to compare their
choices with the outcome of alternative courses of action.
Winning Sfr. 5 in gambling most certainly evokes some
degree of satisfaction, whereas winning Sfr. 5 while know-
ing that one could have won Sfr. 10 had one chosen differ-
ently evokes regret or disappointment [5]. The neural
underpinnings of this effect have recently been investigated
[6-8]. The concept of delayed discounting, concerning the
point in time when a reward is delivered, is a further exam-
ple of the effect of contextual information on the perceived
value of a certain reward [9-12]. Animal studies strengthen
this finding [13,14]. Counterfactual reasoning and delayed
discounting, however, reflect general effects that hold
across subjects, meaning that the contextual information
has a similar impact on each subject.
Food, on the other hand, might be a universal primary
reinforcer but people greatly differ in their taste prefer-
ences. Similarly, interindividual variance in the attractive-
ness of a reward also characterizes branded consumer
goods. The neural representation of brand preferences has
recently received considerable attention. McClure, for
instance, reported that participants show stronger hemo-
dynamic responses in reward-related brain regions (dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), hippocampus,
midbrain) when receiving a small amount of a soft drink
pre-cued by a picture of a Coca-Cola can rather than by a
circle of light or a picture of a Pepsi can [15]. Schaefer and
Rotte reported stronger activity in the medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC) and precuneus when participants were pre-
sented with logos of luxury and sports car brands com-
pared with pragmatic, more economic car brands [16]. In
a study by Deppe et al., participants were asked to imagine
choosing between pairs of brands [17]. The authors
reported reduced neural activity in regions associated with
working memory and reasoning, and increased neural
activity in regions related to emotion processing when
presenting the most popular brand in terms of the market
share as compared with less popular brands. Based on
their findings, the authors postulate a winner-take-all effect
of a person's favorite brand on neural activation, an effect
that would partially contradict the graded response to dif-
ferent amounts of monetary rewards.
To our knowledge, however, none of the available studies
on brand preferences used participants' stated preferences
as a means to specifically varying the subjectively per-
ceived attractiveness of the presented brands. Further-
more, previous brain imaging studies of brand preferences
did not clearly differentiate between the period of reward
anticipation and that of reward receipt. This distinction
between anticipatory (wanting) and evaluative (liking)
components has already been proposed by Berridge on
the basis of animal studies [18], and evidence from
human studies using monetary reward supports this con-
cept [3,19]. Thus, the available studies on brand prefer-
ences may have confounded motivational with evaluative
components of reward processing. Finally, the use of
more than two preference categories is a necessary precon-
dition to unequivocally determining any modulatory
influence of brand preference on neural activity patterns.
It may well be that, similar to monetary rewards, brand-
associated neural activity increases monotonically with
the strength of the individual preference for a particular
brand.
To address these issues, we developed a wheel-of-fortune
game that allowed for the differentiation between an
anticipation period (spinning of the wheel; wishing for a
positive outcome) and an outcome period (processing the
game outcome). Chocolate bars of three different brands
could be won. By using chocolate bars as rewarding stim-Behavioral and Brain Functions 2008, 4:55 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/4/1/55
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uli we introduced a product category with relatively
homogeneous pricing to avoid the coupling of reward
intensity with monetary value, which may be neurally
processed in a different way. Established market research
instruments were used prior to the fMRI experiment to
determine participants' individual brand preferences.
Based on the results of these instruments, brands that dif-
fered in subjective attractiveness were selected individu-
ally for each participant and used as stimuli in an fMRI
experiment. During the experiment, brands were repre-
sented by their logos. However, real chocolate bars were
given to the participants after the experiment.
The primary aim of our study was to explore whether there
are neural structures that modulate their activation
according to the subjective preferences for the chocolate
bar brands that the participants played for (e.g., higher
activity in case of more preferred compared to less pre-
ferred chocolate brands). Additionally, the design allowed
for investigating the suggested dissociation between an
anticipatory reward component (game outcome
unknown, wanting) and an evaluative reward component
(evaluation of game outcome, liking). This dissociation is
important for understanding buying behavior, since antic-
ipation and evaluation are associated with different facets of
a brand: (a) motivational, action-relevant characteristics,
and (b) emotional or cognitive evaluative aspects.
Methods
Participants
Nineteen healthy female adult voluntary participants
(mean age of 24.05 ± 2.63) were recruited from the Uni-
versity of Zurich and ETH Zurich, Switzerland. Partici-
pants were selected based on a two-stage selection
procedure. At the first stage, a paper and pencil question-
naire was distributed to students in different courses of
the Psychology Department of the University of Zurich.
Ninety-eight students completed the questionnaire. Of
those, thirty-one respondents who indicated that they (a)
ate chocolate at least from time to time, (b) cared about
chocolate, (c) cared about brands when it came to choco-
late and who expressed differentiated brand preferences in
a constant sum point allocation "chip game" between dif-
ferent chocolate brands, were invited to the second round.
Given that the majority of the participants who passed
this first phase were female, we decided to restrict the
study to women. However, we do not expect gender differ-
ences in the neural representation of rewards differing in
subjective attractiveness. Twenty-seven of the pre-selected
participants accepted the invitation and filled out a sec-
ond, computer-based questionnaire that aimed at meas-
uring individual brand preferences in more detail with a
choice-based procedure (the GfK Price Challenger, GPC
[20]) and, again, with a constant sum chip game. Of
those, twenty respondents who expressed preferences that
were consistent across the two measures and widely dis-
persed to allow for clear brand differentiation were finally
invited to the fMRI study. One participant dropped out for
private reasons. The remaining nineteen participants gave
informed consent approved by the local ethics committee.
Participation was compensated with 50.00 sFr and the
amount of chocolate bars won.
Task design
Participants played a virtual wheel-of-fortune game pre-
sented via a video projector onto a translucent screen that
participants viewed inside the scanner via a mirror. The
experiment consisted of four runs with 30 trials each. Rou-
tinely, individual T1-weighted anatomic brain images
were recorded before the actual experimental sessions
started. The total scanning time was approximately 50
minutes.
Before being scanned, participants were carefully
informed with respect to the MRI/fMRI method. Follow-
ing this, each participant had to (1) complete a question-
naire that checked for individual MR-suitability and (2) to
give his/her written informed consent. Then, participants
were requested to read a short instruction manual, which
explained the procedures of the experiment, and played
two trials of the wheel-of-fortune game outside the scan-
ner in order to make sure that they had understood the
task.
The experiment had a 3 × 2 × 2 factorial design: Partici-
pants played for three different chocolate brands (1st fac-
tor). These brands were selected based on the preference
data gathered in the second stage of the selection proce-
dure. For each participant, her favorite and her least pre-
ferred yet still acceptable brand were selected, as well as
one intermediate brand that ranked between the top and
the bottom brand. There were two types of trials (2nd fac-
tor), winning trials and losing trials, with two possible
outcomes, respectively (3rd factor): In winning trials par-
ticipants either won or did not win a chocolate bar; in los-
ing trials, already won chocolate bars were either lost or
not lost. The main focus of our study was on the hemody-
namic responses to winning trials, that is, to positive
anticipation and outcomes. We implemented separate
losing trials rather than combining winning and loosing
in one trial (win a chocolate bar vs. loose a chocolate bar)
in order to detach negative, apprehensive processes that
might predominate in some participants from more
cheerful positive expectancy. There is recent empirical evi-
dence that participants anticipate emotional events of
unknown valence to be negative or unpleasant [21]. By
separating the anticipation of positive from the anticipa-
tion of negative outcomes we circumvented this potential
problem.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six differ-
ent pseudorandom trial sequences. In each trial, theBehavioral and Brain Functions 2008, 4:55 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/4/1/55
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chance of winning or losing a chocolate bar was approxi-
mately fifty percent. Also the brands the participants
played for were pseudo-randomly distributed to ensure
enough trials of every possible combination (brand × trial
type × outcome) for the analysis.
One trial consisted of an announcement phase (1 sec.), a
response phase (0.2 – 2 sec), an anticipation phase (10
sec.), an outcome phase (3 sec.), and a blank screen with
a fixation cross (6 sec.; see Figure 1). In the announcement
phase the brand logo was presented in the middle of a
wheel of fortune with six colored (green for wining trials,
red for losing trials) and six black fields. The colors indi-
cated the trial type (winning trial vs. losing trial). During
the response phase, participants could control the entry
speed of the rotation of the wheel of fortune by pressing a
button early or late within the time window. This was
implemented to give participants the feeling of being
actively involved in the game. Additionally, the variable
response latency (200 ms – 2000 ms) induced a dephas-
ing of stimulus onsets with respect to scan onsets to opti-
mize sampling of the hemodynamic response. The entry
speed did not affect the (pseudo-randomized) outcome of
the prior anticipation phase. The anticipation phase
started with the wheel of fortune rotating at the selected
entry speed, slowing down to halt after 10 seconds. The
ensuing outcome phase started after the wheel had
stopped. The outcome was indicated by the field that
came to a halt under a pin at the top of the wheel and it
was also indicated in a text box (i.e., "You have won/lost
1/0 chocolate bars"). To ensure that the fMRI signal could
level back to a task-unspecific baseline, a blank screen
with a fixation cross was presented for six seconds before
the next trial started.
At the beginning of the experiment, each participant
started with an account of three chocolate bars of each
brand. It had been made clear to participants during the
instructions prior to scanning that all major tastes of the
brands they played for were available to choose from (e.g.,
dark chocolate, milk chocolate, hazelnut). Thus, partici-
pants did not have to fear that they would end up with
tastes they did not like. After each of the four runs the
number of chocolate bars was accounted and the balance
was visually presented. This balance was transferred to the
next run. After the experiment, participants received the
total number of chocolate bars won (on average 8.83
chocolate bars), thus ensuring that the wheel-of-fortune
game offered real incentives. Finally, after the four runs
were finished, the participants were paid 50.00 sFr, given
the won chocolate bars in the taste variants of their choice,
and dismissed.
Trials in which participants missed starting the wheel of
fortune (i.e., did not press the button within two seconds)
were regarded as no-interest trials and excluded from the
statistical analyses. The total number of missed trials
across all participants was 8, with a maximum of two lost
trials for two of the participants.
Functional imaging
A Philips Intera 3T whole-body MR unit (Philips Medical
Systems, Best, The Netherlands) equipped with an eight-
channel Philips SENSE head coil was used to acquire mag-
netic resonance images at the University Hospital Zurich.
Anatomical images of the whole brain were obtained by
using a T1-weighted three-dimensional, spoiled, gradient
echo pulse sequence (repetition time (TR) = 20 ms, echo
time (TE) = 2.30 ms, flip angle = 20°, field of view (FOV)
= 220 mm, acquisition matrix = 224 × 224, voxel size =
1.00 × 1.00 × 0.75 mm, 180 slices, slice thickness = 0.75
mm). Functional data for the behavioral tasks were
obtained from 280 whole-head scans per run (1120 for 4
runs) using a Sensitivity Encoded (SENSE) [22] single-
Experimental design of the wheel-of-fortune game Figure 1
Experimental design of the wheel-of-fortune game.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2008, 4:55 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/4/1/55
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shot echoplanar imaging technique (TR = 2500 ms, TE =
35 ms, flip angle = 78°, FOV = 220 mm, acquisition
matrix = 80 × 80, 33 transverse slices, voxel size = 1.72 ×
1.72 × 4.00 mm).
Data analysis
Artifact minimization and MRI data analysis were per-
formed using MATLAB 2006b (Mathworks Inc., Natick,
Massachusetts, USA), and the SPM5 software package
(Institute of Neurology, London, UK). The first three
images were discarded to allow for steady-state magneti-
zation. All images were realigned to the first image of the
first run, spatially normalized into standard stereotactic
MNI-space (EPI template provided by the Montreal Neu-
rological Institute), interpolated to a voxel size of 2.00 ×
2.00 × 2.00 mm and spatially smoothed using a 8-mm
full-with-at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel.
Activated voxels were identified by the general linear
model approach, implemented in SPM5. At the first level
of analysis, we adopted a parametric analysis according to
Büchel et al. [23]. After highpass-filtering (cut-off 128 s),
an individual statistical model was computed for each
participant with separate regressors for the response phase
(modeled as events), for the anticipation phase of win-
ning and losing trials (each modeled as epochs of 10 s),
and for each possible outcome type (won winning trial,
not-won winning trial, lost losing trial, not-lost losing
trial, modeled as epochs of 3 s). All regressors were con-
volved with SPM's canonical difference of gamma hemo-
dynamic response function. The maximal cross-
correlation between regressors was on average ρ = 0.156
(SD = 0.033) across all subjects.
Given that the main purpose of the analysis was to iden-
tify regions whose hemodynamic response monotonically
increased or decreased with individual brand ranking, the
ranks of the brands in the individual preference hierarchy
were included in the model as modulatory parameters
(i.e., 3, 2, 1, from the most to the least preferred brand).
Linear contrasts of the first-order terms against a baseline
(6 seconds rest epoch, blank screen with fixation cross)
were performed. This was applied to the anticipation
phases of winning trials and losing trials, the outcome
phases of winning trials that were won and not won, and
the outcome phases of losing trials that were not lost and
lost (contrasts are indicated by ** 1, e.g., WA1). To addi-
tionally obtain results of the main effect of the task, indi-
vidual baseline contrasts were performed using the zeroth
order regressor of the respective conditions (contrasts are
indicated by ** 0, e.g., WA0). A complete list of all experi-
mental conditions is given in table 1.
To permit population-level inferences, maps of contrast
coefficients for each of the first level contrasts were collec-
tively submitted to one-sample t-tests against the null
hypothesis of no activation, while controlling for random
effects. Given that the outcome phase immediately fol-
lowed the anticipation phase yields the possibility that
clusters of activation found in the outcome phase are also
due to continuing activity elicited during the anticipation
phase. Taking this possible confound into account, we
additionally reduced the search area for activations in the
outcome phase (WOW1, WOnW1, LOL1 LOnL1) to the
areas activated by the preceding anticipation phase (WA1,
LA1). No clusters of activation remained.
To explore the full range of effects in the data, voxels sur-
viving significance thresholding at p < .001, uncorrected
for multiple comparisons with a spatial extent threshold
at k = 10 voxel were reported. For specific regions a priori
hypotheses could be derived from findings of prior stud-
ies using reward paradigms [19,24-26]. Small volume cor-
rections (SVCs) were used for these regions to correct the
false positive error probability for the number of compar-
isons made within each region. SVCs were applied with a
sphere of 8 mm, chosen to be equal to the spatial smooth-
ing kernel [27-29]. Peaks surviving p < .05 family-wise
error (FWE) correction were considered significant. The
cluster locations were indicated by the coordinates of the
voxel at the local cluster maximum and labeled using the
automated anatomical labeling (AAL) toolbox [30]. Clus-
ter locations that were not identified with the AAL toolbox
were manually labeled with reference to the Harvard-
Oxford subcortical structural atlas. By overlaying the sta-
tistical parametric maps on an averaged and normalized
structural (T1) image of all subjects, we ensured that the
cluster locations were within the reported neuronal struc-
tures.
Results
The main focus of our study was placed on brain regions
in which neuronal responses increase or decrease monot-
onically with increasing brand preference during the
anticipation phase preceding winning trials (WA) and the
outcome phase following gains in winning trials (WOW).
This represents the first-order term in the parametric anal-
ysis. We also included losing trials into our experiment to
balance the amount of gained rewards and to dissociate
gain from loss phases (see methods section). For descrip-
Table 1: List of experimental conditions.
Trial type: Phase: Outcome: Abbreviation:
Winning Anticipation Won & not won WA
Winning Outcome Won WOW
Winning Outcome Not won WOnW
Losing Anticipation Lost & not lost LA
Losing Outcome Lost LOL
Losing Outcome Not lost LOnLBehavioral and Brain Functions 2008, 4:55 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/4/1/55
Page 6 of 13
(page number not for citation purposes)
tive purposes, we additionally conducted first-order para-
metrical analyses of anticipation phases of losing trials
(LA1) and outcome phases of lost losing trials (LOL1)
[Additional file 1]. For outcomes with no effect on gaining
or losing chocolate bars (WOnW1 and LOnL1), no signifi-
cant preference-modulated clusters were located (p < .001
for multiple comparisons). Thus, the reported findings
refer to expectations and outcomes of rewards (chocolate
bars) rather than to an unspecific effect of brand logo
presentation.
Main effects of task
The effects of the zeroth order term of the parametric anal-
ysis (main effect of the tasks) were not of interest for the
current study question. For the sake of completeness the
corresponding results of WA0 and WOW0 are listed in the
supplement [Additional file 2].
Anticipation phase of winning trials
The contrasts of the first order parametric modulation of
the anticipation phase of winning trials (WA1) revealed
several brain areas that showed linearly increasing hemo-
dynamic responses with higher subjective preference: Left
caudal premotor area, right rostral premotor area, right
lateral orbitofrontal cortex reaching into the anterior
insula, right posterior superior temporal sulcus/anterola-
teral intraparietal sulcus, and the dopaminergic midbrain.
Clusters of voxels showing a linear decrease in neural activ-
ity with higher subjective preferences (WA1) were located
in the left middle frontal gyrus, left middle cingulate cor-
tex, bilateral precuneus, left calcarine sulcus, left angular
gyrus, left lingual gyrus, left fusiform gyrus and right mid-
dle cerebellum (Figure 2, Table 2).
Outcome phase of won winning trials
In the outcome phase of won winning trials, clusters of
voxels in the following regions increased their hemody-
namic response linearly with higher subjective preference
for the reward (WOW1): The right precuneus, right supra-
marginal gyrus, left and right lingual gyrus, left posterior
cingulum, right caudate nucleus, right superior temporal
sulcus, right postcentral gyrus, right and left cerebellum
including the vermis, left middle temporal gyrus, left
superior occipital areas, right frontal inferior operculum,
right superior frontal area, left angular gyrus and right
ventral pallidum (Figure 3, Table 3).
The analysis revealed no significant clusters of voxels
which show a linear decrease in activity with increasing
subjective preference (WOW1).
Discussion
The anticipation of acquiring desired objects plays an
essential role in everyday life. There are clear interindivid-
Table 2: Clusters showing preference-dependent activation during the anticipation phase. 
Neural activity in regions Right/Left Cluster Size
(Voxels)
Coordinates t-value
XYZ
increasing linearly with subjective preference:
Caudal premotor area L 99 -16 -8 62 5.89
Rostral premotor area R 13 16 4 68 3.86
Lateral orbitofrontal cortex/anterior insula R 15 44 28 -12 3.97
Posterior superior temporal sulcus/anterolateral intraparietal sulcus R 11 42 -48 14 4.18
Dopaminergic midbrain (substantia nigra) R 33 10 -18 -6 4.01
decreasing linearly with subjective preference:
Middle frontal gyrus L 71 -36 12 60 6.02
Posterior cingulate cortex L 32 -4 -30 40 4.85
Posterior cingulate cortex L 38 -16 -50 36 4.36
Precuneus L 443 -4 -50 8 5.67
Precuneus R 6 -52 14 5.23
Precuneus L -2 -58 26 3.84
Precuneus L 173 -2 -72 34 4.66
Calcarine sulcus L -4 -70 16 4.08
Middle occipital cortex L 88 -42 -76 34 4.74
Angular gyrus L -52 -74 26 4.78
Lingual gyrus L 35 -8 -80 -8 4.34
Lingual gyrus L -16 -82 -6 3.92
Fusiform gyrus L 13 -26 -42 -14 4.28
Middle cerebellum 10 R 15 28 -36 -40 4.65
All clusters show a probability of error of p < .001 uncorrected for whole brain multiple comparisons. The coordinates and t-values are at the peak 
voxels in each cluster (coordinates refer to MNI-space). Clusters written in bold letters are within a priori hypothesized regions and remained 
significant after family-wise error (FWE, p < 0.05) correction applied for small volumes (sphere with 8 mm radius).Behavioral and Brain Functions 2008, 4:55 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/4/1/55
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ual differences in the preferences for choice alternatives,
be it in connection with fashion, food, or cars. However,
it is unclear to what extent subjectively defined preference
levels (e.g., most preferred brand) modulate activation in
brain regions that are typically involved in reward process-
ing. Therefore, the purpose of the present study was to
Brain regions showing preference-modulated activation during the anticipation phase of winning trials Figure 2
Brain regions showing preference-modulated activation during the anticipation phase of winning trials. (A) 
Bilateral mesial premotor/supplementary motor area showing most powerful activations, (B) right superior temporal sulcus, 
and (C) right anterior insula/lateral orbitofrontal cortex with significant activation patterns at uncorrected level of p < .001 
with clusters with more than 10 voxels. (D) A cluster of midbrain activation was found at a close to significant level after small 
volume correction at threshold level p < .01. Neural activity in brain regions negatively correlated with the brand preference 
(i.e., showing less activation for more preferred brands) during the anticipation phase: (E) left frontal middle gyrus, (F) left pos-
terior cingulate cortex, (G) left precuneus.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2008, 4:55 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/4/1/55
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investigate brain areas that are sensitive to subjective
reward intensity. For this purpose, we evaluated the neu-
ral activation patterns associated with the expectation and
evaluation of receiving desired compared to less desired
objects. A further aim of this study was to examine
whether the modulation of neural activity by the intensity
of brand attractiveness was evident in distinct neural net-
works during the anticipation of the desired objects and
during the evaluation of the receipt of these objects. Using
a wheel-of-fortune game, we found that during anticipa-
tion the hemodynamic responses in the premotor cortex,
the lateral orbitofrontal cortex, the insula, and the
dopaminergic midbrain are linearly correlated with the
subjective preference of a desired object. Activation in
these areas was strongest while the participants expected
to win the most desired object. In addition, the hemody-
namic responses in the left middle frontal gyrus, posterior
cingulate cortex and several extrastriate visual areas were
negatively correlated with the expectation to win a desired
object. In the ensuing outcome phase, while participants
evaluated the positive game outcome, a distinct neural
network commonly associated with attentional processes,
sympathetic arousal, and cognitive-emotional evaluation
of rewards showed preference-modulated activity.
Anticipation phase of winning trials
The most striking finding of our study is a linear increase
in hemodynamic responses in the left caudal and rostral
premotor cortex the more participants desired to win a
chocolate bar. Previous studies also found reward-
dependent activation in premotor areas. It was, for exam-
ple, reported that premotor regions become more active
with increasing monetary reward in a target detection task
[26]. Also, in non-human primates, dorsal but also lateral
prefrontal regions including the premotor cortex were
rendered active while expecting rewards [31]. Further-
more, Roesch and Olson reported increasing activity in
premotor neurons in macaque brains dependent on the
value of a predicted reward [32]. In contrast to these stud-
ies, reward delivery in our study did not depend on an
instrumental motor action (e.g., grasping a reward). Thus,
a simple motor preparation account is not sufficient to
Table 3: Clusters showing preference-dependent activation during the outcome phase. 
Neural activity of regions increasing linearly with subjective preference: Right/Left Cluster Size
(Voxels)
Coordinates t-value
XYZ
Caudate nucleus R 51 18 8 18 5.19
Caudate nucleus R 16 2 26 4.92
Ventral pallidum R 82 24 2 -8 4.28
Precuneus R 200 6 -46 6 5.88
Posterior cingulum L -2 -42 8 5.21
Vermis L/R 0 -54 -4 4.24
Precuneus R 24 16 -60 40 5.25
Lingual gyrus L 187 -20 -72 -4 5.29
Lingual gyrus L -14 -82 -12 4.89
Lingual gyrus L -12 -80 -2 4.68
Superior occipital L 16 -14 -96 20 4.47
Lingual gyrus L 16 -14 -56 0 3.90
Lingual gyrus L 29 -6 -66 4 4.03
Lingual gyrus R 74 22 -90 -16 4.82
Inferior occipital gyrus R 34 -22 -16 3.74
Lingual gyrus R 35 22 -52 -2 4.40
Lingual gyrus R 14 -50 -4 4.26
Cerebellum crus 1 R 140 16 -82 -28 4.62
Cerebellum crus 1 R 6 -20 -22 4.34
Cerebellum crus 1 L 20 -22 -66 -34 4.22
Superior temporal gyrus R 19 52 -26 16 4.90
Supramarginal gyrus R 62 42 -42 22 5.57
Supramarginal gyrus R 13 46 -28 28 4.49
Middle temporal gyrus L 13 -38 -56 16 4.55
Angluar gyrus L -42 -52 22 3.98
Postcentral gyrus R 13 38 -30 54 4.86
Frontal inferior gyrus, triangular part R 14 28 16 20 4.16
Superior frontal gyrus R 12 18 28 40 4.15
All clusters show a probability of error of p < .001 uncorrected for whole-brain multiple comparisons. The coordinates and t-values are at the peak 
voxels in each cluster (coordinates refer to MNI-space). Clusters written in bold letters are within a priori hypothesized regions and remained 
significant after family-wise error (FWE, p < 0.05) correction applied for small volumes (sphere with 8 mm radius).Behavioral and Brain Functions 2008, 4:55 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/4/1/55
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explain our finding. We interpret the increase in bilateral
premotor activity as an increased state of motor prepared-
ness, which may facilitate approaching behavior. Modula-
tion of motor preparedness by different values of
subjective brand preferences may occur automatically due
to action-inducing characteristics of such incentive stim-
uli. In a low-involvement buying situation increased pre-
motor activity could already be sufficient to "tip the
scales" so that a person snatches at one product without
making a deliberate decision to do so.
The reduced hemodynamic responses in the left MFG in
anticipation of winning a more preferred chocolate bar
may reflect the functional antagonist to the increased pre-
motor activity. In a meta-analytic study, Rubia et al. report
that this area (besides others) is activated in several Go/
No-Go tasks – a task demanding high-level cognitive func-
tions of decision-making, response selection and response
inhibition [33]. When playing for a more preferred choc-
olate brand in our study, such cognitive response control
may be reduced. Support for this idea comes from Deppe
et al. who report decreased neural activity in the left hem-
ispheric middle frontal gyrus when participants imagined
making binary decisions between a target brand, which
was the market leader, and another (less popular) brand,
as compared with choices between two less popular
brands [17]. In another recent study, Schaefer and Rotte
found reduced activation in a right hemispheric homo-
logue when participants saw attractive car brands com-
pared to less attractive car brands [34]. Both research
groups concluded that rational thinking might be reduced
when confronted with favored brands.
In summary, the pattern of activity in the above men-
tioned neural network indicates an increased state of
motivation for motor action (e.g., facilitating approach-
ing behavior). But what inherent properties of an object
make it more desirable (so that it will be approached
more frequently) than others? The increased hemody-
namic responses in the right anterior insula/lateral orbit-
ofrontal cortex when playing for preferred chocolate
brands may signal enhanced somatic arousal associated
with a favorite reward. Supporting this idea, the right
insula plays a prominent role in the somatic-marker
Brain regions showing preference-modulated activation during the outcome phase of won winning trials Figure 3
Brain regions showing preference-modulated activation during the outcome phase of won winning trials. (A) 
Caudate nucleus, (B) pallidum, (C)/(D) lingual gyrus, (E)/(F) cerebellum crus 1.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2008, 4:55 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/4/1/55
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hypothesis [35]. According to this hypothesis, insular acti-
vation provides a neural substrate of emotional feeling
states arising from automatic somatosensory responses,
making them available to cortical processing and con-
scious awareness. In line with this idea, Critchley and col-
leagues found right hemispheric activation in anterior
insular and orbitofrontal regions associated with sympa-
thetic arousal in a reward-related decision-making task
[36]. The authors suggested that these two regions are
modulated by changes in peripheral somatic states and
involved in the flexible representation of reinforcement
[37].
We discovered preference-modulated hemodynamic
responses in mesolimbic regions in the right midbrain.
Dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain reflect the incen-
tive or motivational value of a future reward and are asso-
ciated with a subjective state of wanting [25,38].
Additionally, studies with non-human primates demon-
strated increased firing rates in dopaminergic midbrain
neurons during the anticipation of rewards after associa-
tions between predictive cues and reinforcers have been
learned [39]. In the case of the chocolate brand logos that
we used, the association between the predictive cues (i.e.,
the logos) and reinforcers (e.g., delicious chocolate) has
likely been established by previous learning experiences
of our participants.
The cluster of preference-modulated activity in the right
anterolateral intraparietal region, which extends into the
superior temporal sulcus (STS) probably reflects the proc-
ess of inferring from the motion of the wheel whether the
trial will be won or not; the higher the incentive value of
the reward, the more relevant is this prediction. In previ-
ous studies, increased activity in this area was assumed to
reflect action-outcome prediction through observation
[40,41]. Furthermore, the anatomical proximity to the
parietal cortex, which has been found to be involved in
visuo-spatial processing [42], underpins the notion that
this area could be involved in the processing of spatial
contiguity between current position and desired outcome
position.
The negatively correlated neural activity (lower hemody-
namic response while anticipating more desired objects)
found in regions encompassing the posterior cingulate
gyrus, precuneus, lingual gyrus, fusiform gyrus and cere-
bellum may be due to task-induced deactivation (TID).
TID refers to a relative decrease in regional activity, as
measured by blood flow or the blood oxygenation level
dependent (BOLD) signal, during an active task compared
to a "resting" baseline [43]. We believe that the decrease
in the BOLD signal in the above mentioned neural struc-
tures refers to a higher externally cued cognitive involve-
ment in the anticipation phase for more preferred brands
compared to less preferred brands, resulting in a higher
suppression of internally generated information process-
ing. The study of McKiernan showed that TID increased
with task processing demands [43]. TID often occurs in
the posterior cingulate cortex extending dorsally into the
precuneus [44,45], but also in the precuneus and fusiform
gyrus [43], and was repeatedly shown to be of higher mag-
nitude in the left cortical hemisphere [44-46].
In summary, hemodynamic responses increased in areas
associated with motor preparation, emotional tagging of
stimuli, reward expectation and spatial attention in the
anticipation phase of the wheel-of-fortune game while
playing for a more desired item. Conversely, neural activ-
ity in structures involved in stop inhibition of motor
responses and internal information processing linearly
decreased. While expecting the outcome, participants
encountered an increased state of wanting (dopaminergic
midbrain↑), external information processing (TID
areas↓) and emotional tagging of the incentive stimulus
(left anterior insula↑), leading to a state of facilitated
action induction (bilateral premotor cortex↑, middle
frontal gyrus↓).
Outcome phase of won winning trials
In the time window after the participants saw the final
outcome position of the wheel of fortune, preference-
modulated activations were found in the caudate nucleus,
precuneus, lingual gyrus, cerebellum, and, to a lesser
extent, in the pallidum. Our results seem to reflect prefer-
ence-dependent modulation of attentional processes,
sympathetic arousal, and of cognitive-emotional evalua-
tion of the reward value.
When participants were "rewarded" with more preferred
chocolate bars, we found increased activity in the right
caudate nucleus, traditionally seen as a "motor" region.
Findings of Haruno et al. suggest, however, that the cau-
date nucleus is strongly involved in reward based behav-
ioral learning [47]. It has further been shown in monkeys
[31,48] and rats [49] that part of caudate-putamen neu-
rons respond to food and drink reward stimuli in a man-
ner similar to dopaminergic or ventral striatal neurons.
The ventral pallidum (VP) has been suggested to represent
a central relay station for the distributed brain circuit of
core liking [18,50], as well as a potential relay station to
cortical systems of conscious pleasure [50]. Neurons in
the VP are assumed to track the hedonic value of reward-
ing and appealing stimuli [51,52]. Besides the activation
of "liking" structures via more primary taste rewards and
sexual or competitive arousal, it has been shown that
more abstract pleasures like monetary rewards also
increase activity in the VP [19].Behavioral and Brain Functions 2008, 4:55 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/4/1/55
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In the outcome phase many occipito-parietal regions, like
the precuneus and parts of the lingual gyrus where found
to be more active when winning a more preferred choco-
late bar. We interpret this assembly of activations as a neu-
ral representation of top-down controlled visual
attention. Playing for more preferred compared to less
preferred chocolate bars is likely associated with a higher
interest in the game outcome, which might cause a
stronger attention focus on the outcome situation (visual
perception and processing of the outcome). A cue for top-
down attentional orientation in the visual field could be
provided by an early tagging of emotional stimuli as
Schupp et al. inferred from recent EEG studies [53-55].
We found brand-preference-modulated activity also in the
cerebellum, namely in the vermis and right-sided crus 1.
In addition to its predominant role in motor functions, it
has been shown that the cerebellum is involved in higher
cognitive and emotional processes [56]. The cerebellum is
also an important component of autonomic control func-
tioning. In line with this idea, Critchley et al. found dis-
tributed cerebellar activations similar to ours when
participants experienced states of arousal [57]. Regarding
our study, we can only speculate that some heightened
state of arousal was induced by winning a highly desired
compared to a less desired chocolate bar.
The interpretation of the activations in the superior tem-
poral sulcus, middle temporal sulcus, supramarginal
gyrus and postcentral gyrus, inferior frontal and superior
frontal regions is somewhat difficult, since these regions
are not known to be specifically involved in reward or
feedback processing. Given that the reward participants
received in this study was merely artificial in that they
were reflected by the gain in chocolate bars summed up
on an account, feedback processing might consist of more
abstract, higher-level cognitions. For example, the
increased activity in these regions could be related to the
processing of spatial information of the wheel of fortune
(e.g., "what is the relation to the initial speed set and the
position of the wheel when it stops?"). Alternatively,
changes in cerebral blood flow may have been induced
through a heightened state of emotional/autonomic
arousal or through attentional processes.
Neuronal networks increasingly active with brand prefer-
ence in the outcome phase have been commonly linked to
feedback processing, bodily perception of pleasurable
arousal, and visuo-spatial attention. Participants regis-
tered the feedback of winning a more preferred brand
with increased visual attention (occipital cortex↑) leading
to a positive pleasurable feeling (ventral pallidum↑)
accompanied with a heightened state of arousal (ventral
pallidum↑, cerebellum↑).
Limitations
One has to bear in mind that the neural activity pattern
found in our study reflects to a certain degree interactions
of subjective preference and the experimental task. For
example, our participants expected a reward with uncer-
tainty. It has been repeatedly shown that the factor of
reward probability partly alters the involvement of the
reward network [19,58,59]. A second, and in our view,
important factor is whether participants actually receive
immediate sensory or material rewards, or delayed sym-
bolic rewards obtained only after conclusion of the exper-
iment. In our study, participants received the won bars of
chocolate after the experiment outside the scanner. This is
important, considering that partly different brain activa-
tions were found for instance in the study by O'Doherty
in which participants received differently tasting liquids
during the experiment [25], compared with studies in
which participants were rewarded with announcements of
small money amounts that they received only after the
scanning procedure [3,26,60].
This temporal delay of the actual reward receipt may
partly explain why we did not observe preference-depend-
ent activity in some brain areas previously indicated by
studies exploring reward-related brain activations (e.g.,
prefrontal cortex or nucleus accumbens, for a review, see
[58]). Another striking difference between our and previ-
ous studies is that we use differentially preferred incen-
tives of the same product class and same price category.
The rewards expected by a participant – and evaluated
after the outcome of the wheel-of-fortune game – did not
differ significantly in their magnitude of objective (e.g.,
monetary) value, solely in the magnitude of subjective
value. Participants possibly wanted to win each trial and
"liked" every won winning trial. The rewards are objec-
tively the same (one bar of chocolate), the only difference
being the subjective preference of the reward. Our aim was
to identify the neuronal correlates of the subjective, cul-
turally learned preferences that have a modulatory impact
on wanting and liking, and influence approach behavior.
Hemodynamic responses in the lateral orbitofrontal cor-
tex and the insula correlated with the subjective prefer-
ence for the expected gain during the anticipation phase.
Neural activity in the OFC is known to correlate with the
incentive value of the expected reward [2]. The additional
activations found in the insula support the idea that emo-
tions and feelings are evoked in this phase. Some recent
studies propose a functional dissociation between the lat-
eral and mesial OFC activation. While the mesial OFC is
most strongly involved during anticipation of rewarding
stimuli, the lateral OFC seems to be more strongly acti-
vated when punishment or deficits are anticipated [61].
However, as winning trials were explicitly separated from
losing trials, the pattern of activation is unlikely to reflectBehavioral and Brain Functions 2008, 4:55 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/4/1/55
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engagement in anticipating losses or punishment rather
than receiving rewarding stimuli.
Conclusion
The results of our study clearly demonstrate that neural
activation in reward processing structures is modulated by
stimuli varying in subjective reward intensity. This modu-
lation was evident in situations where participants antici-
pated a reward and in situations where participants
evaluated a reward. Contrary to the winner-take-all
hypothesis [17], neural activity was linearly associated
with the subjective brand preference hierarchy, which is in
line with studies using objectively varied amounts of
money as rewards. Furthermore, distinct brand-prefer-
ence-modulated areas were identified during anticipation
and evaluation phases. When participants anticipate win-
ning a more preferred brand they experience an increased
state of wanting. This is characterized by intensified
processing of external information and emotional tagging
of the incentive stimulus, leading to a state of facilitated
action induction. Thus, the pattern of activity may reflect
approach behavior in real life situations, such as opting
for a particular product on the shopping shelf.
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